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WHEN considering the measure of compensation for a wrong, the
practitioner typically thinks in terms of proven damages, plus puni-
tive damages if real villainy can be shown. But if he so restricts his
thinking he may be depriving his client of a considerable sum of
money.
Suppose a trespasser on vacant land has made a million dollars
by holding a circus, the damages for the trespass being nominal. Or
suppose a tract developer sees he can save large sums by deliberately
turning his tractors into another's orchard, the damage again being
nominal. Or suppose Gye, knowing of Miss Wagner's contract to sing
opera for Lumley, makes a fortune by having her sing for him in-
stead.' To announce, in situations such as these, that the law allows
a recovery of proven damages and no more is not enough.
It is the thesis of this article that a wrongdoer's profits as an
alternative to his victim's proven damages can, more often than not,
be recovered on the theory of a constructive trust; and that, where
there is no basis for the imposition of a constructive trust, a strong
argument can be had for the achievement of the same result in quasi-
contract.
Profiis Secured via Decree in Equity
To secure the defendant's profits facts must be averred and es-
tablished which will support the jurisdiction of equity in the cause.
This, it seems, is so even where law and equity are merged for pro-
cedural purposes. The fact that the complaint need merely set forth
the facts constituting the cause of action and a demand for the re-
lief to which the complainant supposes himself to be entitled does not
mean that he can get equitable relief where a separate court of
chancery would not have accorded such relief. The codes do not
change the substantive rules of equity.2
When a case is made for relief such as an injunction no problem
is presented. Thus in St. James Church v. Superior Court3 it was
held that, although when the complaint is for an ascertainable sum,
*Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara.
1 Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
2 See Bradley v. United States, 214 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1954).
3 135 Cal. App. 2d 352, 287 P.2d 387 (1955).
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no case for an accounting in equity is stated, yet if an injunction is
sought equity has exclusive jurisdiction. Similarly, if the remedy
sought is reformation or cancellation of an instrument by reason of
the defendant's wrong, equity has jurisdiction to decree that he ac-
count for his profits.4 In L. Martin Co. v. L. Martin & Wilckes Co.,5
the New Jersey Supreme Court went so far as to announce that the
rule for ascertaining the compensation of a complaint seeking injunc-
tive relief for unfair competition was not his damages, but the de-
fendant's profits. It applied the analogy of the patent infringement
cases, where the infringer is treated as a "trustee for the owner of the
patent, as regards the profits made by the use of his invention."6
More accurately stated, the court, instead of sending the plaintiff to a
court of law to recover damages, will award compensation computed
by the same rule that courts of equity apply to a trustee who has
wrongfully used the trust property for his own advantage.7 How-
ever, insofar as this suggests that equity has no choice in the matter
and cannot award damages as an alternative to profits, it is misleading.
When, on the other hand, the situation does not call for equitable
relief it must be shown that a bill for an accounting will lie. The
traditional grounds on which jurisdiction to decree an accounting in
equity is based are three in number: the existence of a fiduciary rela-
tion between the parties, a complexity of the accounting situation, or
a need for discovery to determine the amount due.8 As to the first
of these, it should be remembered that for this purpose the fiduciary
concept today extends to a legion of situations where confidence has
been reposed and abused, and is not restricted to true fiduciaries.9
As to the second, the very fact that the amount of a defendant's
profit is not known, or within his peculiar knowledge, can well be
argued to present a complexity of the accounting situation.'0 In
4 See National Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl.
1964) (reformation); Sebree v. Rosen, 374 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1964) (cancella-
tion).5 75 N.J. Eq. 257, 72 A. 294 (Ct. Err. & App. 1909).
6 Id. at 260, 72 A. at 295.
7 Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136 (1888).
8 Kalberloh v. Stewart, 378 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1964). As to the historical
origins of the bill for accounting in equity, see Langdell, A Brief Survey of
Equity Jurisdiction (pts. 1-2), 2 HARV. L. REv. 249, 3 id. 237 (1889-1890);
Belsheim, The Old Action of Account, 45 HARV. L. Rrr. 466 (1932); Lile, Bills
for Account (pts. 1-2), 8 VA. L. Rrv. 181, 266 (1922).
9 See, e.g., Chalupiak v. Stahlman, 368 Pa. 83, 81 A.2d 577 (1951).
10 See Rosenak v. Poller, 290 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (holding that ac-
counting is predicated on the assumption that the plaintiff does not have the
means to determine how much, or in fact whether any money properly his,
is being held by another); Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. Keystate Ins. Co., 420 Pa.
578, 218 A.2d 294 (1966) (accounting against insurance agent both because
confidence reposed and because of complexity of accounts and amounts in-
volved peculiarly within defendant's knowledge).
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light of modem stream-lined discovery procedures, however, it does
not seem that the third ground carries much weight today.'1
Where there is no apparent ground of equitable jurisdiction and
no statute authorizing a recovery of the defendant's profits (as there
is in the trademark and copyright infringement situations), and where
any complexity of the accounting situation can be resolved by a dis-
covery order, the matter may yet be within the purview of equity.
It can usually be argued that equity, by tradition, always has con-
current jurisdiction in cases of fraud 2 and that equitable or "con-
structive" fraud can consist of any unconscientious conduct whereby
the defendant has acquired a benefit. For example, a suit for mis-
appropriation of trade secrets disclosed in confidence has been re-
garded as a suit in equity whether or not injunctive relief is
sought.' 3 Possibly the very fact that the defendant's profits exceed
any damages the plaintiff could prove might support an argument
that the remedy at law is inadequate.14 In New York, for exam-
ple, where a thief can be treated as a constructive trustee of the
stolen goods or their proceeds, the fact that a suit at law for con-
version lies does not preclude the remedy in equity, because "broader
relief may be obtained in equity than at law."' 5
A few courts have allowed a prayer for injunctive relief to sup-
port an accounting even where the need for such injunctive relief is
not shown'; and indeed, the logic of letting the measure of a victim's
recovery depend on the accident of whether or not he needs injunc-
tive relief is not apparent.
The most frequent applications of the suit in equity to recover a
defendant's profits are, of course, where equity jurisdiction de-
rives from the abuse of a fiduciary relation. For the accountability of
such self-dealing officers as trustees, agents, including servants and
attorneys, executors, guardians, partners and joint adventurers, and
corporate officers, including promoters in some circumstances, author-
ity need not be cited. In addition, a case may well be presented for
11 See Arnold Prods., Inc. v. Favorite Films Corp., 298 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1962).
12 See Nieberding v. Phoenix Mfg. Co., 31 IM. App. 2d 350, 176 N.E.2d
385 (1961); Stark v. Cole, 373 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1963).
'3 Kirschner v. West Co., 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962).
'4 See Ingram v. People's Fin. & Thrift Co., 226 Ala. 317, 146 So. 822
(1933); Concrete Coring Contractors, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors & Eng'rs,
Inc., 220 Ga. 714, 141 S.E.2d 439 (1965).
15 Majestic Loose Leaf v. Cannizzaro, 10 Misc. 2d 1040, 169 N.Y.S.2d 566
(Sup. Ct. 1957); Fur & Wool Trading, Ltd. v. Fox, Inc., 245 N.Y. 215, 156 N.E.
670 (1927).
16 See Blisscraft v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1961); Scovill
Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Elec. Mfg. Co., 31 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). Other ex-
amples are cited in the discussion of interference with contract accompanying
notes 81-93 infra. Cf. Root v. Lakeshore & M.S.R.R., 105 U.S. 189 (1881).
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the accountability of defendants enjoying the status of investment ad-
visors, bailees, escrow holders, pledgees, mortgagees in possession, life
tenants, cotenants and, of course, holders of governmental office.
But it is with the nonfiduciary tortfeasor that this article is primarily
concerned.
Enough has been said to indicate that a court, once it has the
equitable powers formerly exercisable by the ancient courts of chan-
cery can, if it so chooses, decree that any tortfeasor, fiduciary or not,
disgorge his profits. Objection has sometimes been made that there
can be no constructive trust without a trust res, an identifiable sub-
ject matter to which the defendant has legal title.17 Clearly the
thief of a chattel, or the misappropriator of another's intangible rights
of commercial value, acquires title to nothing and cannot strictly be
called a trustee. But the courts have long overlooked this academic
difficulty. The "trust" is nothing more than an analogy, a device em-
ployed by equity to compel restitution. Whether or not the suit can
be brought into equity, the inquiry now is to determine if the same
result can. be achieved at law via waiver of tort and suit in assumpsit.
Profit Recovery in Assumpsit
What is the relation between the quasi-contractual suit in as-
sumpsit and the equitable suit to impress a constructive trust? The
answer is this: Of old, both common law and chancery judges came
upon situations of unjust enrichment where justice cried out for
some remedial relief not within the existing framework. The common
lawyers adapted the writ of assumpsit to meet the need. The law
implies a debt, they said, an obligation to make restitution to the ex-
tent of the defendant's enrichment.'8 So was born quasi-contract, a
remedy at law available where the defendant is simply obliged by
the ties of natural justice to make restitution. But the common law-
yers, traditionally disciplined in the doctrine of stare decisis, regarded
sweeping doctrines of this nature with suspicion. They were reluctant
to extend this emergency remedy to situations wherein precedent
could not be found. Hence the law of quasi-contract looks like a
grab bag of isolated instances rather than a picture of the orderly
development of a broad doctrine covering situations of unjust enrich-
ment. At any rate during its early development, the plaintiff had to
show not only that the defendant was enriched, but that his own es-
tate was diminished by the conduct of which the plaintiff com-
17 See Lister v. Stubbs, 45 Ch. D. 1 (1890), where the court declined to
impress a trust on investments made by an agent with illegal commissions
he had received, opining that his liability to his principal was that of a mere
debtor. See also Waters, The English Constructive Trust: A Look into the
Future, 19 VA-D. L. REv. 1215 (1966).
Is Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760).
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plained.1 Recovery was limited to the extent of such diminution.
20
This would, if true today, pretty well rule out assumpsit as a profit-
recovery remedy.
The chancellors, on the other hand, were not so inhibited. Equity
acted on the person of the defendant, on his conscience. A decree in
equity did not purport, originally, to be an adjudication of the legal
rights involved. That was the task of the law. It simply ordered the
defendant, on pain of contempt (or other ancillary remedies) to per-
form a particular act. The chancellors did not need to seek out prec-
edents to support an order that he make restitution of his gains be-
yond the plaintiff's proven damage. Thus it is that the develop-
ment of profit-recovery doctrines has been largely on the equity side
of our courts. However, this does not necessarily mean that such
profits cannot be recovered on a basis of quasi-contract.
Many years ago, a federal court announced that, whenever a
tortfeasor is enriched by his wrongdoing, he must make restitution,
and that this obligation can be enforced in assumpsit.21 A recent
encyclopedia expresses the same doctrine.22 Since the authority to
support this proposition is slight indeed, a more thorough examina-
tion is required. This requires a separate consideration of three re-
lated questions: (a) can the defendant's gains be recovered in as-
sumpsit irrespective of any showing of loss to the plaintiff; (b) is the
measure of recovery in such a suit truly the gain acquired by the
defendant, or is it merely the reasonable value of what he received;
and (c) does the proposition, if it is sound, extend to torts other
than those involving the appropriation of physical property of an-
other? The following discussion goes far to show that, though none
of these questions receives an affirmative answer under the tradi-
tional view of the quasi-contract remedy, there is much to support
such an answer.
Must Diminution of Plaintiffs Estate Be Shown?
In Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co. 23 the Supreme Court of Washington
held the converter of an egg-washing machine liable in quasi-contract
for the value of his savings, called "profit from the use" of the ma-
chine, despite a contention that the plaintiff incurred no loss since he
had no present use for it. The invasion of his right to its exclusive
use was said to be enough to constitute the "loss" which, the court
19 W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 163 (1893); F. WOODWARD, QUASI CON-
TRACTs § 274 (1913).
20 F. WOODWARD, supra note 19, § 274.
21 Second Nat'l Bank v. M. Samuel & Sons, Inc., 12 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.
1926).
22 1 Am. JuR. 2d Actions § 32 n.16 (1962).
23 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946).
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conceded, must be shown. And, before the constructive trust evolved
to its present position as a comprehensive profit-recovery device, a
federal court took a similar approach in a suit for interference with
contract.24 "The point," it said, "is not whether a definite something
was taken away from plaintiff and added to the treasury of defendant.
The point is whether defendant unjustly enriched itself by doing a
wrong to plaintiff in such manner and in such circumstances that in
equity and good conscience defendant should not be permitted to re-
tain that by which it has been enriched. '25
Measure of Recovery-Defendant's Profits, or Reasonable Value?
Traditionally, the measure of recovery in quasi-contract would
appear to be the reasonable value, objectively regarded, of the prop-
erty involved or, if it is restored, of its use.20  But authority for a
more subjective test, namely the value to the defendant, is by no
means restricted to the egg machine case, discussed above. In Ryan
& Associates v. Century Brewing Association,27 where recovery on a
quantum meruit basis for the service of originating an advertising
slogan was had, the court specifically declined to limit recovery to
the mere service of conceiving the idea and writing it out, stating that
the value of the service to the user was the proper measure. Again,
in Ablah v. Eyman28 a suit involving a counterclaim against one who
had wrongfully replevied work papers of an accountant, the court
held a cause of action stated for recovery in quasi-contract of the
value the wrongdoer had received from the use of the papers. And in
Robbins v. Frank Cooper Associates29 it is stated that the measure
of recovery on a contract implied in fact is the reasonable worth of
the thing taken, but that when recovery is in quasi-contract the
defendant's actual profit is the true measure. Since the proceeds
received by a conscious chattel converter can be recovered in assump-
sit, it seems only logical to allow the victim of any conscious mis-
appropriation of another's intangibles the value to the defendant of
what he has taken.
24 Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., 268
F. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).25 Id. at 582.
26 E.g., Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946);
Paar v. City of Prescott, 59 Ariz. 497, 130 P.2d 40 (1942); Franks v. Lockwood,
146 Conn. 273, 150 A.2d 215 (1959); Dean v. Kenyon & Eckhardt, Inc., 39 Misc.
2d 184, 240 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
27 185 Wash. 600, 55 P.2d 1053 (1936).
28 188 Kan. 665, 365 P.2d 181 (1961).
29 19 App. Div. 2d 242, 241 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1963).
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Does Assumpsit Lie for Torts Not Involving Misappropriation of
Physical Property?
Though it has long been recognized that a remedy lies for tortious
deprivation of the services of a servant or of a child, 0 and for tortious
usurpation of a public office,31 the typical recovery in quasi-contract
is where the wrong consists in the conversion of a chattel.32 However,
the Ryan case above is only one of many where the remedy has been
granted for tortious misappropriation of another's intangibles.
Assumpsit for the reasonable value of a converted chattel is based
on the fiction of a sale to the converter. Clearly, such a fiction would
not fit the misappropriator of another's intangibles, such as trade
secrets or contract rights. He is usually enjoined from continuing
his practices. This is entirely inconsistent with any fictitious pur-
chase of the right to continue. But if a chattel converter who has
resold is liable in assumpsit for money had and received, why should
not the same remedy lie, on the same fiction of a ratification of what
the defendant did as the plaintiff's agent, for these other misapprop-
riations?
Applicability of the Restitutionary Remedies to Specific Torts
Having determined that a decree that the defendant account for
his profits is competent whenever equity has jurisdiction, and that the
same result may well be obtainable by waiver of tort and suit in
assumpsit, it remains to consider the extent to which these remedies
are in fact being applied by the courts.
Use of Land
Where a defendant has tortiously acquired the title to land, the
courts will readily find at least constructive fraud, and will hold
him as a constructive trustee for the true owner.33 Accountability
for gains derived from its use or for the proceeds of its resale, if trace-
able, is unquestioned. 34
If he is a mere trespasser, can the value of his use and occupa-
tion be recovered in assumpsit? The traditional negative answer,
though rejected in many states35 cannot yet be regarded as a mere
30 F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 285 (1913).
31 Id. § 287.
32 Id. §§ 276-80.
33 4 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 468 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
8 166 (1937).
34 3 G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 472 (2d ed. 1960); 4 A. SCOTT, supra
note 33, § 508; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151, comment f at 604 (1937).
35 California, Kansas, South Dakota, Texas, and probably Kentucky and
Virginia. See, e.g., Don v. Trojan Constr. Co., 178 Cal. App. 2d 135, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 626 (1960).
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museum piece.36 But since the law allows the reasonable value of
the occupancy as the measure of recovery in trespass37 and mesne
profits on ejectment are measured by the same yardstick3s this is of
little importance. Can there be recovery beyond this reasonable value
of the occupancy? In Edwards v. Lee 39 a landowner had developed
and advertised as the "Great Onyx Cave," a cave which ran partly
under his land and partly under that of the plaintiff. He showed
it to sightseers for an admission fee. In enjoining the continued tres-
pass the court allowed the plaintiff the proportion of the defendant's
net profits derived from the use of the plaintiff's land. The court
declined to commit itself on the basis of the decree-whether it was
assumpsit for use and occupation, or mesne profits, or whether it was
based on the analogy of the tortious use of another's chattels. A con-
curring judge sought to predicate accountability on a theory of co-
tenancy, the cave being treated as an entire unit and the respective
joint owners entitled to their "aliquot part of the entire attractive
vacuum made by nature .... -40 Whatever the basis, it seems clear
that the profits would have been recovered no matter what relation
they bore to the reasonable rental value of the land. Whether the
framers of the Restatement of Restitution, in "welcoming" this deci-
sion41 do so as a recognition that assumpsit can lie for the use of
land or as an opening wedge to a broad doctrine that any wrongdoer
can be accountable for his gains as such, is not clear. Very likely
the latter, since to differentiate between the tortious use of land and
the tortious use of chattels or intangibles, such as trade secrets, seems
to make little sense.
In any case, should a court be reluctant to follow the "cave
case" as a precedent for equitable relief against a trespasser, an ar-
gument for the recovery in assumpsit of the value of the use of the
land for the purpose for which the defendant used it, as distinguished
from the objective "reasonable value" test, can be buttressed by the
egg machine case.42 In Shell Petroleum v. Scully43 the defendant ob-
tained information of value through an unauthorized geological ex-
ploration of the plaintiff's land. Though the suit was in trespass, the
court took the position that the measure of compensation should be
36 The rule denying recovery in assunpsit has recognition in Georgia,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Penn-
sylvania and Wisconsin.
37 See Scott v. Scott, 347 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
38 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3334; see Falejczyk v. Meo, 31 1ll. App. 2d 372, 176
N.E.2d 10 (1961).
39 265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936).
40 Id. at 434, 96 S.W.2d at 1035.
41 See W. SEAVEY & A. ScoTT, NOTES TO THE RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
194 (1937).
42 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
43 71 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1934).
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the value of what was taken, as a kind of quasi-contractual obliga-
tion arising from the tort.
Conversion of Chattels
If a conscious converter retains the chattels he has converted,
there being an adequate remedy at law for their recovery, no con-
structive trust can be employed.44 But if he has resold, it is well
settled that a constructive trust can be impressed on the proceeds.45
This, incidentally, might be a case where equity has jurisdiction
simply because assumpsit is not as adequate-the judgment in as-
sumpsit does not give the victim priority over other creditors.
Whether or not the converter has resold, could the victim recover
profits derived from the use of the chattel? In equity, the answer
would seem to depend on whether there has been a resale. If there
has not (unless one shares the New York view that a converter can
be a constructive trustee of the item itself) ,46 equity would appear to
have no jurisdiction. If there has, of course, the converter can be
accountable for such gains on the theory of a constructive trust. If
the cause of action is based on assumpsit and the converter has
resold, an argument for the recovery of the value of the use could
be based on a fictitious agency. The defendant has held and sold the
chattel as the plaintiff's agent; hence gains derived from its interim
use are as properly recoverable as the price ultimately received. If
the converter has not resold, and the effort is to recover the reason-
able value of the property on the fiction of a sale at the time of the
conversion, the value of the use would not be recoverable. If, how-
ever, the plaintiff desires to recover the chattel itself, there is no
logical reason why the interim value of its use could not be re-
covered. And if, in this situation, the reasoning of the egg machine
case is adhered to, the measure of recovery can be the subjective
value of its use to the defendant.4
The innocent converter cannot be held beyond the reasonable
value of the chattel converted.48 If he has used it, recovery for the
use cannot exceed the reasonable value of such actual use.
49
44 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 33, § 508.1; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 166,
comment b at 674 (1937).
45 Equitable Trust Co. v. Connecticut Brass & Mfg. Corp., 290 F. 712 (2d
Cir. 1923), 10 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1926); Loring v. Baker, 329 Mass. 63, 106
N.E.2d 434 (1952).
46 See Baxter House, Inc. v. Rosen, 27 App. Div. 2d 258, 278 N.Y.S.2d
442 (1967).
47 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151(f) (1937).
48 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 33, § 509; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 155(1937).49 See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 128, illustration 20 at 536 (1937).
Compare id. § 157, illustration 7 at 629, where the recipient does not qualify
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Patent Infringements
Due to concern over the difficulties of apportioning a patent in-
fringer's profits and the expense and delay involved in accountings
before a master, the patent law was amended in 1946 to exclude
defendants' profits as an item of recovery.50
If the infringer made his profits while in violation of an injunc-
tion, and was thus in contempt of court, an argument that to permit
him to retain the fruits of his wrong would defeat the ends of justice
will still carry much force in seeking recovery of those profits.5 1
Infringement of Statutory Copyright
A provision of the Copyright Act-a source of tremendous diffi-
culty in construction-allows proven damages "as well as" the in-
fringer's profits, or, in lieu thereof, "such damages as to the court
shall appear to be just. 5 2
Infringement of Common Law Copyright (Literary Property)
One who has not registered a copyright retains, ad infinitum, a
property right in his work until by general publication a right to its
use has been dedicated to the public. 3 This right, which extends
to a musical performance, is not lost by a limited publication such as
a broadcast.54 The profits of one who misappropriates such prop-
erty,55 for example by making a recording and selling reproductions,56
can be recovered. In Miller v. Universal Pictures Co.57 the plaintiff,
executrix of Glenn Miller's estate, had given a contractual right to
Radio Corporation of America exclusively to market, on a royalty
basis, Miller's phonograph recordings. She then contracted with Uni-
versal for the filming of Miller's life. The contract permitted the use
of these recordings in the making of the sound track and for ad-
vertising the motion picture. Universal made its own sound track,
as a converter until the fraud is made known to him, and thus the traditional
"benefit to defendant" is the measure of recovery for the value of the use of
the chattel.50 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1964).
51 See Hayslip v. Textag Co., 94 F. Supp. 425 (N.D. Ga. 1950), aff'd, 192
F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1951). There is statutory basis for the recovery of the
profits of one who infringes a design patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1964).
52 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1964).
53 Fashion Originator's Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940);
Gantz v. Hercules Publishing Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 1061, 182 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Sup.
Ct. 1959).
54 Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc. v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 199
Misc. 786, 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
55 Brown v. Republic Prods., Inc., 26 Cal. 2d 867, 161 P.2d 796 (1945).





based on a close study of the recordings, and then made its own re-
cordings of this sound track which it sold to the public. The court
held that the plaintiff had the right to an accounting.58 It con-
sidered that the damage might be extended to the profits from the
sale of these recordings.5 9 It would seem however that the plaintiff's
right should be restricted to the royalties she would have received
had these sales been made by Radio Corporation of America. If A
has rented a chattel to B, and C wrongfully takes it from B and
makes a greater profit from its use than would B, why should A re-
cover more than he would have received from B? Is not B rather
than A the one wronged?
Although titles as such are not protected by either the Lanham
Act ° or the Copyright Act, 1 if it can be shown that the title of a
work has acquired a secondary meaning title piracy may well support
a recovery of profits as an act of unfair competition.
62
Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
Recovery for the misappropriation of a trade secret can be
predicated on a theory of damages in tort, in which case, of course,
the plaintiff's lost profits can be established by reference to the
defendant's profits.0 3  Recovery can also be based on a theory of
quasi-contract or implied in fact contract, where the reasonable value
of the secret would be the measure of recovery. 4  Defendant's
profits as such, however, are commonly recovered on the basis of a
constructive trust. 5
Misappropriation of Ideas
Courts were once consistent in defeating attempts to delve into
the pockets of defendants via claims for compensation for the use
of ideas. 0 The thinking was that, if one chooses to blurt out his idea
58 Id. at 634, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 395.
59 Id.
00 28 U.S.C. § 1542 (1964).
01 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
62 See Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures, 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433
(1950).
63 See Harry F. Deffler v. Kleman, 19 App. Div. 2d 396, 243 N.Y.S.2d 930
(1963).
04 International Indus., Inc. v. Warner Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696 (3d
Cir. 1957); cf. Art Wire & Stamping Co. v. Fishing, 7 N.J. Super. 173, 72
A.2d 523 (Super. Ct. 1949).
05 See, e.g., Gottscho v. American Mktg. Corp., 26 N.J. 229, 139 A.2d 281
(1958). Even in England, more conservative than American jurisdictions in
the use of the constructive trust, the formula for an eye ointment was long
ago held to be the res of a trust of the business of producing such a commodity
for the misappropriation of which accountability could lie. Green v. Folgham,
57 Eng. Rep. 159 (1823).
08 Bristol v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506 (1892).
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without first having ensured his right to compensation he has no one
to blame but himself. Neither the common law nor statutory law ex-
tends copyright protection to a mere idea. But this notion has pro-
voked some self-examination of the judicial conscience. Recovery
has been permitted on a variety of theories. Courts have talked of
breach of confidence,6 7 implied contract,68 and quasi-contract;69 for
if an idea be reduced to concrete form and is novel, who can say it is
not "property" for the conversion of which assumpsit will lie?70
Further, if in concrete form, is it not literary property? 71 And if it
is disclosed to another is it not possible that the very disclosure im-
plies a promise to compensate the discloser if use is made of it? 72
Where the theory of recovery is an implied in fact contract, only
the reasonable value of the idea can be recovered. Where quasi-con-
tract is the basis, it seems from what has been said above that a good
argument can be made for the recovery of the value of the idea to the
defendant. Where the suit presented is for equitable relief for an
abuse of confidence reposed, profits can be recovered as such.7 3 The
parallel between this and trade secrets is too close to be ignored.
If the idea has been reduced to a concrete form, such as a slogan,
the cause should be presented as one for the infringement of literary
property. The slogan can be the res of a trust.74 If not, the pos-
sibility of being relegated to a reasonable-market-value recovery
would be reduced by presenting the cause as one for the misappropri-
ation of a trade secret, in which case the idea need not be shown to
be novel.75 Here the courts, treading firmer ground, will be less
likely to feel constrained by early doctrines denying a property right
in ideas and by policies against rewarding unsolicited "blurters."
Other Unfair Business Practices
The Federal Trademark Act explicitly confers the right to award
an infringer's profits in certain circumstances. 76 But aside from this,
67 Davies v. Krasna, 245 Cal. App. 2d 535, 54 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1966); cf.
Hamilton Nat'1 Bank v. Belt, 210 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
68 Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
69 Weitzencorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953).
70 See Ryan & Associates v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600, 55
P.2d 1053 (1936).
71 See Hedeman Prods. Corp. v. Tap-Rite Prods. Corp., 228 F. Supp. 630(D.N.J. 1964); Colvig v. KSFO, 224 Cal. App. 2d 357, 36 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1964).
72 See Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal. 2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953); Kurlan
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 40 Cal. 2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953); Desny v.
Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
73 See Booth v. Stutz Motor Car Co., 24 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1928).
74 See Bolt Associates, Inc. v. Alpine Geophysical Associates, Inc., 244
F. Supp. 458 (D.N.J. 1965).
75 See Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198
(1962).
76 15 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1114(1) (1964).
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such a decree is common whenever unfair competition is the basis of
the cause of action. This applies not only to trademark and trade
name infringements outside of the federal statute77 but also to tor-
tious imitations of the design or appearance of another's goods78 and,
indeed, to the types of conduct denounced as "harvesting" where the
defendant did not "sow" when this is enjoinable as unfair competi-
tion7 9 In general, the courts require a showing that a defendant's
conduct be unconscionable before this drastic type of relief will
lie.80
Interference with Contract
As to whether profits resulting from this tort can be awarded,8 '
it is submitted that the noncommittal attitude of the Restatement of
Restitution8 2 is unjustified.
Second National Bank v. Samuel & Sons,8 3 wherein the court
announced the proposition that any tortfeasor can be made to re-
store his gains in assumpsit, was a case involving inducement of
breach of contract. In Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. U.S. Sugar
Equalization Board, Inc.8 4 the plaintiff had a contract to supply
sugar to a commission representing the Norwegian government. The
defendant, an administrative agency, refused the plaintiff an export
license. It told the commission that only the defendant agency
could supply the sugar. Thereupon the commission, having a license,
bought the sugar from the defendant. The court held a cause of ac-
tion in assumpsit to be stated for the defendant's profits.8 5 Caskie v.
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.8 6 held that where a defendant, know-
77 See, e.g., Dell Publishing Co. v. Stanley Publications, 18 Misc. 2d 437,
188 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Wilson v. Graphol Prods. Co., 188 F.2d 498
(Cust. Ct. 1951); Robert Reiss & Co. v. Herman B. Reiss, Inc., 63 N.Y.S.2d
786 (Supp. Ct. 1946).
78 See, e.g., Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct.
1956) (cause of action for accounting stated). See generally RESTATE ENT OF
TORTS §§ 741-42 (1938).
79 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Record Corp., 109 F. Supp.
330' (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Veatch v. Wagner' 109 F* Supp. 537 (D. Alas. 1953)
(cause of action stated against -radio station which broadcast news items
misappropriated from plaintiff newspaper).
80 See Nims, Damages and Accounting Procedure in Unfair Competition
Cases (pts. 1-2), 31 CORNELL L.Q. 431, 32 id. 24 (1946); Callman, He Who Reaps
Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Compe-
tition, 55 Hnv. L. REv. 595 (1942); Developments in the Law: Competitive
Torts, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888 (1964).81 See Comment, Plaintiff's Measure of Recovery for Tortious Induce-
ment of Breach of Contract-Profits or Losses?, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1119 (1968).
82 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 133, comment c (1937).
83 12 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1926).
84 268 F. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
85 Id. at 583.
86 321 Pa. 157, 184 A. 17 (1936).
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ing that an obligor has a contractual obligation to pay a sum to an
obligee, induces the obligor to make payment instead to the defendant,
assumpsit will lie for the restitution of such money.87
Turning now to relief in equity, Schechter v. Friedman8 involved
a situation where a defendant, with knowledge of the plaintiff's ex-
clusive right to the output of a manufacturer, maliciously acquired
that output for himself. The plaintiff was held entitled to an ac-
counting of his profits.8 9 Incidentally, this relief was held to be avail-
able even though the ostensible basis of equity jurisdiction, the need
for injunctive relief, had fallen away. In Wear-Ever Aluminum Co.,
v. Townscraft Industries, Inc.90 a New Jersey Court, although
confining relief for employee-pirating to the plaintiff's lost profits
plus training costs, expressly declined to limit recovery to this relief.91
In Automatic Laundry Service v. Demas92 the defendant had knowl-
edge of a profit-sharing contract wherein the plaintiff was to supply
adequate washing machines for the needs of a trailer park. By vir-
tue of this contract the park owner had a duty not to install com-
peting machines. With such knowledge the defendant cooperated
with the owner in improper competition consisting of the installation
of competing machines. He was held accountable for his profits.93
Here again the need for injunctive relief was doubtful, but the
equitable jurisdiction remained.
Homicide
Either by statute or by decisional law, many of the states in this
country use the constructive trust to extend relief where a murderer
acquires property by inheritance from his victim.9 4 There is no
doubt that this will carry with it accountability for gains made from
the use of such property or profits resulting from its resale.95
87 Id. at 160, 184 A. at 18.
88 141 N.J. Eq. 318, 57 A.2d 251 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948).
89 Id. at 325, 57 A.2d at 255.
90 75 N.J. Super. 135, 182 A.2d 387 (Super. Ct. 1962). The case is also
of interest, especially in this technological age, as authority for the proposition
that interference with a contract can be tortious even where the contract is
terminable at the will of either employer or employee.
91 Id. at 150, 182 A.2d at 396.
92 216 Md. 544, 141 A.2d 497 (1958).
93 Id. at 551, 141 A.2d at 501.
94 E.g., Dutill v. Dana, 148 Me. 541, 113 A.2d 499 (1952); Estate of Kalfus
v. Kalfus, 81 N.J. Super. 435, 195 A.2d 903 (Super. Ct. 1963); Parks v. Dumas,
321 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); 4 A. ScoTT, supra note 33, § 492. For
a compilation of the states which have specific statutes dealing with the case
where one acquires property by the murder of another, see id. § 492.1.
95 4 A. Scowr, supra note 33, § 508; 3 G. BOGERT, supra note 34, § 472.
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Libel: Invasion of Privacy
In Hart v. E.P. Dutton Co.96 a New York court made it plain that
it did not think the time had come to "take the profits out of" a
tortious libel. It considered that the torts in respect of which assump-
sit would lie were all torts involving injury to property97 and ad-
verted to the difficulty of showing what proportion of a publisher's
profits were due to the libel and not to outside elements.9 8 It
relied on two precedents denying recovery of profits for invasion of
privacy.9 9 More recently, an attempt to recover profits derived from
an invasion of privacy failed because no invasion was found. 00
In Maritote v. Desilu Productions, Inc.10 1 a federal court held
that Illinois law does not permit recovery by the representative of
a decedent, in quasi-contract, for an invasion of the decedent's pri-
vacy. At the same time the court recommended a reform of the law.
10 2
In Schumann v. Loew's, Inc °. 0 3 a New York court, doubtful whether
one has a right in his name which survives death, denied recovery to
descendents of a celebrity of profits derived from a movie of his
life.
It has been suggested that the failure to extend the quasi-con-
tract remedy to invasions of privacy is due to a reluctance to recog-
nize rights of personality as marketable.10 4 More probably, however,
it is due to the tradition-not, as we have seen, consistently respected
-that quasi-contract does not lie where the defendant's enrichment
is not accompanied by a concurrent diminution of the plaintiff's estate.
But even if assumpsit is not an appropriate remedy, what about
the constructive trust? In Schillinger v. Schillinger House'0 5 a dece-
dent's executrix was held entitled to an accounting of profits resulting
from the wrongful use of the name Schillinger. She and the Schil-
linger Society had acquiesced in the use of the name as long as the
defendant school was dedicated to the teaching of Schillinger theory.
But there is no indication that anyone had sustained loss from the
defendant's use of the name for his own commercial purposes, and it
96 197 Misc. 274, 93 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1949), affd mem., 277 App.
Div. 935, 98 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1950).
97 Id. at 277, 93 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
98 Id. at 280-81, 93 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
99 Bunnell v. Keystone Varnish Co., 254 App. Div. 885, 6 N.Y.S.2d 350
(1938); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944).
100 Fleischer v. WPIX, Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 17, 213 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
101 230 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1964), aff'd, 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1965).
102 Id. at 725-26.
103 135 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
104 Gordon, Recovery for Violation of the Right of Privacy in Quasi-Con-
tract and the Federal Income Tax: An Illustration of Law's Response to
Changes in Attitudes about the Personality, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 368 (1964).
105 101 F. Supp. 707 (D. Mass. 1951).
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seems evident that, in granting the injunction and accounting, the
preoccupation of the court was with protecting the memory of the
personality of Joseph Schillinger on behalf of his widow and the
Schillinger Society.
Indeed, there seems to be no good reason why a court, in the
exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, should not decree an accounting
of the profits resulting both from invasion of privacy and from libel.
As it is hoped this survey has shown, a court can, if it chooses, do so
where any other form of gainful tort is involved. The difficulty of
ascertaining the proportion of the gains deriving from the tort and
that deriving from extrinsic factors is not insuperable. The courts
have evolved various formulas to assist in the discharge of this
burden.10 And, particularly in states such as California, where the
legislature has expressly enacted that a wrongdoer is an involuntary
trustee of his gains,'07 where is the logic of drawing a line where the
gains result from a tortious exploitation of rights of personality?
106 See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 225
U.S. 604 (1911); Allen v. Standard Crankshaft & Hydraulic Co., 231 F. Supp.
301 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
107 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2224.
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